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ARTICLE

The Influence of History on States'
Compliance with Human Rights Obligations
ADAM S. CHILTON* & ERIc A. POSNERt

There is considerable variation in countries' respectfor human rights. Scholars have
tried to explain this variation on the basis of current conditions in countries-such as
democrag and civil war-andeventsfrom the recentpast-such as ratification of human
rights treaties. This literaturehas ignored the influence that history may have on human
rightsperformance.Drawing on the literatureon economic development-which has shown
that institutions, events, and conditionsfrom the distantpast heavily influence the rate of
economic growth across countries todqy-we argue that scholars should study whether the
samefactors have influenced modern human rightsperformance. Our exploratory look at
the data suggests that respectfor human rights today may be related to the geographic
location of affectedpopulationscenturies ago, the nature ofthe institutions that emerged at
that time, and cultural traits that have been passed down from generation to generation.
These preliminary results suggest that human rights scholars could make substantial
progress toward understandingstates' human rightspractices by building on the work of
development economics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Some countries enjoy stable democratic institutions, respect for human
rights, and the rule of law. Other countries do not. A large literature in
political science tries to explain this variation, focusing on what researchers
call "repression' -censorship, intimidation, torture, extrajudicial killing,
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and related coercive measures. Repression is higher in autocratic, poor, and
populous countries; in countries embroiled in international or civil wars; and
in countries with weak domestic legal institutions.'
A related literature has examined the influence of international human
rights treaties on the behavior of countries. 2 This literature overlaps with
the literature on repression. Repression means the violation of certain
human rights-above all, political rights like the right to free speech and a
fair trial. But human rights treaties set out many other types of rightsincluding broader civil and political rights (for example, religious freedom),
economic and social rights (for example, to medical care and education),
and a range of nondiscrimination rights. The fine-grained nature of the
treaties has led researchers to use more fine-grained dependent variables,
like literacy and women's health, to test whether the treaties have affected
the behavior of governments. The evidence suggests that human rights
treaties have either a modest effect or no effect on the behavior of
governments. 3
The two literatures share a common starting point: that repression and
other abuses by a government reflect its immediate needs or the conditions
under which it operates. A government might use repression to counter
political dissent or a threat to its power posed by an insurgency; human
rights violations might prevail in a country because of weak courts, a corrupt
bureaucracy, a poor educational system, and other institutional problems.
Although this literature is descriptive, it leads naturally to prescriptions that
1. For a recent survey of this literature, see Daniel W. Hill, Jr. & Zachary M. Jones, An Empirical
Evaluationof ExplanatioisforState Repression, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 661 (2014). For examples of articles
written in this literature, see CHRISTIAN DAVENPORT, STATE REPRESSION AND THE DOMESTIC
DEMOCRATIC PEACE (2007); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, George W. Downs et al., Thinking Inside the
Box:A Closer Look at Democracy andHuman Rights, 49 INT'L STUD. Q. 439 (2005); Scott Sigmund Gartner
& Patrick M. Regan, Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship Between Government and Opposition
Violence, 33 J. PEACE RES. 273 (1996); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde & Ryan S. Jablonski,
When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 149 (2014); Steven C. Poe & C.
Neal Tate, Repression of.Human Rights to PersonalIntegrity in the 1980s: A GlobalAnaysis, 88 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 853 (1994); Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Personallntegrit Revisited:A Global

Cress-NationalStudy Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT'L STUD.

Q.

291 (1999); David L. Richards,

Perilous Proxy: Human Rights andthe Presence of NationalElections,80 SOC. SCI. Q. 648 (1999).
2. For a recent survey of this literature, see Beth A. Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13
ANN. R. POL. SCI. 273, 288-92 (2010) [hereinafter Simmons, Treay Compliance]. For examples of work
in this literature, see Yonatan Lupu, Lgslative Veto Players and the Effects of InternationalHuman Rights
Agreements, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 578 (2015) [hereinafter Lupu, Legislative Veto Players]; ERIC A. POSNER,
THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014); Yonatan Lupu, Best Evidence: The Role ofInformation in
Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements, 67 INT'L ORG. 469 (2013)
[hereinafter Lupu, Best Evidence]; Yonatan Lupu, The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the
SpatialModel to Address Selection Effects, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 912 (2013) [hereinafter Lupu, The Informative
Power ofTreaty Commitment]; Daniel W. Hill, Estimatingthe Effects ofHuman Rights Treaties on State Behavior,
72 J. POL. 1161 (2010); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) [hereinafter SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS];
Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rghts TreatiesMake a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
3. For a discussion of this literature, see PART II.
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respond to the short-term nature of these problems. If western countries
encourage elections that unseat repressive governments or provide aid
conditional on institutional reform, then repression will decline and human
rights will improve. Many scholars believe that international human rights
law can similarly improve the behavior of countries by threatening
repressive governments with sanctions, reputational harm, and other costs.
There is a parallel between this premise and a view that once dominated
an area of economics known as development economics. This field seeks to
explain why some countries have enjoyed greater economic growth than
other countries. 4 Numerous researchers in this field have implicitly assumed
that economies should develop at some incremental rate reflecting the
advance of technology, the expansion of trade, and related factors. Where
economies did not grow at this rate, an explanation was called for. Scholars
proposed that the problem may lie in the lack of capital; or people with the
right skills; or pro-growth market institutions. All of these explanations led
to a specific development agenda: make loans to the country or firms in it;
or offer training and education to the citizens of the country; or encourage
the country to sign free-trade pacts and to implement market reforms.5
In the last fifteen years, however, a more pessimistic strain of thinking
has emerged. This new literature seeks explanations for poor economic
growth in fixed conditions (like geography) or events in the distant past (like
wars and population movements). The most famous of these explanations,
proposed by Jared Diamond (a noneconomist, but whose work has
influenced economists), is that- environmental conditions as long ago as
10,000 B.C. favored the ancestors of modern-day Europeans, who
developed a technological head start that allowed them to rule the rest of
the planet for centuries and still enjoy a higher standard of living than most
other people. 6 Institutional pathways extending into the distant past may
determine which countries enjoy the most economic growth and which do
not. A possible implication of this approach for the foreign aid agenda is
that some economies will not develop as quickly as others, which implies
that some countries are doomed to be poorer than others purely as a result
of the part of the world in which they are located.
4. For a survey, see HANDBOOKS IN ECONOMICs 22: HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
VOLUME 1A (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf, eds., 1st ed. 2005).
5. For a discussion of the history of foreign aid, see WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE
CWHITE MAN'S
BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S EFFORTS To AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO
LITTLE GOOD (2006).
6. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (1997).
For statistical support for Diamond's theory, see Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. & Ola Olsson, Geography,
Biogeography, and Why Some Counines Are Rich and OthersAre Poor, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 3715
(2003).
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Economists have proposed a variety of explanations that link modernday economic growth to geographic location and events remote in history.7
One view is that a country with natural resources, access to the sea, a
temperate climate, and other favorable geographic conditions will benefit
economically from the contribution of these factors to agricultural
productivity, industry, and trade. Other approaches are less focused on
geography than on history. Researchers have argued that institutions display
significant inertia. Countries that developed high-quality institutions in the
distant past tended to maintain them over time, as did countries that
developed low-quality institutions. Head starts in institutional development
are preserved for centuries. And some scholars have argued that geography
and institutional development interact in complex ways. Favorable
environmental conditions in the distant past-1 500 A.D. is a common point
of reference-may give rise to high-quality institutions that continue to
benefit countries even after the advantages from the environmental
conditions no longer matter. For example, one theory is that higher-growth
countries outside Europe are those that were settled by Europeans who
built viable economies that could prosper in temperate climatic conditions,
rather than those that, because of the risk of disease, Europeans exploited
without regard to long-term consequences. Countries that prosper today are
those that were lucky enough to receive high-quality institutions hundreds
of years ago. 8
These theories, which emphasize long-term historical and fixed
geographic conditions, have gained influence in part because the
development strategies suggested by the earlier literature have had mixed
success. 9 While scholars disagree about the effectiveness of foreign aid for
promoting economic growth, our reading of the literature is that if there is
a positive effect, it is quite limited.1 0 There is evidence that suggests that
7. See Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots ofEconomic Development?, 51

J.

ECON. LIT. 325 (2013) [hereinafter Spolare & Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots] (surveying literature);

Nathan Nunn, The Importance of.Historyfor Economic Development, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 65 (2009) (same);
Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and Economic
Development: Theory, History, and Findings, 11 ANN. REV. POLIT. SC. 119 (2008) (same); Nathan Nunn,
HistoricalDevelopment, in HANDBOOK VOLUME 2, supra note 4, at 347 (same).
8. For a discussion of this literature, see PART II.B. The long-term persistence of cultural and
institutional norms has also received a great deal of attention among historians. See, e.g., DAVID
HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA (1989) (describing the
influence of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century norms in England on twentieth-century norms in
areas of the United States where colonists settled).

9. See William Easterly et al., Aid, Policies and Growth, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 774 (2004). Some
scholars have even suggested that foreign aid hurts countries by damaging democratic institutions. See
Djankov, Montalvo et al., The Curse ofAid (Working Paper 2005); Kevin M. Morrison, What Can We
Learn About the 'Resource Curse" from Foreign Aid?, 27 WORLD BANK REs. OBS. 52, 58-64 (2010)
(surveying the literature).

10. See, e.g., Michael A. Clemens et al., Counting Chickens When They Hatch: Timing and the Effects of
Aid on Growth, 122 ECON.J. 590 (2011); David Roodman, TheAnarchy ofNumbers:Aid Development, and
Cross-Country Empirics, 21 WORLD BANK ECON. REV: 255 (2007) (finding that the results of studies
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conditioning aid on institutional improvements also has no discernible
effect on economic growth." If a country's rate of economic growth is the
result of entrenched institutional structures and cultural traits that have their
roots in the distant past or in fixed geographic conditions, the failure of
development strategies is easy to understand.
In this Article, we apply some of these lessons to human rights. The
literature on international human rights law suggests that international law
has little effect on the political behavior of states, just as the development
literature suggests that foreign aid has little effect on the economic activity
of states. Just as the disappointing results in the development literature have
led to a search for long-term influences on economic growth, the
disappointing results in the international human rights law literature should
lead to a search for long-term influences on human rights performance, or
so we argue. If the human rights performance of states is tied to conditions
hundreds of years ago, then threatening human rights violators with
sanctions will have limited effect on their behavior.
To test this hypothesis, we draw on the new economic development
literature, which provides a set of theories and empirical results that can be
applied, mutatis mutandi, to human rights. Our working hypothesis is that the
temporally remote factors (or fixed geographic conditions) that may explain
why some countries grow faster than others may also explain why some
countries respect human rights more than others. To explore this
hypothesis, we march through the development literature and try to bring
the theories and data in that literature to bear on the question of why some
countries today respect human rights and others do not.12
At the outset, we should be clear that we do not test any of the
hypotheses using statistical analysis. The purpose of this paper is not to
make empirical claims about the relationship between historical variables
and human rights compliance, but to persuade readers that this is a fruitful
research project. This paper should be understood as a first step toward
exploring which of the hypotheses seem plausible enough-on theoretical
and empirical grounds-to warrant further testing.
that show that foreign aid promotes economic growth are "fragile"). But see Markus Bruickner, On the
Simultaneiy Problemin the Aid and Growth Debate, 28 J. APPL. ECON. 126 (2013) (arguing that the effect
of foreign aid on growth is understated because donors reduce aid when growth increases).
11. See T.N. Srinivasan, Attacking Poverty: A Lost Opportuniy-World Development Report 2000-01, 2
S. ASIA ECON. J. 123 (2001).
12. There is a related literature in political science, which has sought to locate certain types of
political outcomes (such as authoritarianism or the subordination of women) in culture, tradition, or
religion. See, e.g., M. Steven Fish, Islam andAuthoritarianism,55 WORLD POL. 4 (2002). Economists have
also studied this hypothesis and found empirical support for it. See, e.g., Guido Tabellini, Culture and
Institutions:Economic Development in the Regions ofEurope, 8 J. EUR. ECON. Ass'N 677 (2010) (finding that
literacy rates and political institutions in the past influence cultural traits, which in turn affect economic
development). The relationship between institutions and culture is complex. We abstract away from
this distinction because our focus is the relationship between historical factors (whether institutional
or cultural) and human rights performance today.
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II. THE EMPIRICAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT LITERATURES
Over the last fifteen years, scholars of human rights and development
economics have used empirical research methods to explain the different
opportunities that people have across countries. Scholars of human rights
have sought to explain differences in the amount of repression across
countries, and scholars of development economics have sought to explain
differences in wealth across countries. Despite the many similarities
between these topics, the human rights literature has largely ignored the turn
toward historical explanations for contemporaneous events that has taken
place in development economics.
In this section, we lay the foundation for our argument that human
rights scholars should build on the work of development economics. First,
we discuss the findings of the empirical human rights literature that has
emerged over the last fifteen years. Second, we provide background on the
empirical literature on development economics. Third, we outline how the
methods and approaches used by development economics can help to
explain current human rights practices.
A. Human Rights
Since World War II, governments have expended considerable effort to
negotiate major international treaties that commit states to respecting the
rights of their citizens. It is only in the last fifteen years, however, that
political scientists and legal scholars have begun to use empirical methods
to evaluate whether these treaties have actually helped improve human
rights practices.13
Empirical researchers have primarily tried to test the effectiveness of
international human rights law by studying whether ratifying one of the six
"'core" international human rights agreements is associated with improved
human rights practices.1 4 Those six agreements are: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);15 the. International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);1 6 the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
13. For papers surveying empirical research on the effect of international human rights
agreements, see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, A SocialSienceofHuman Rights, 51 J. PEACE REs. 273 (2014);
Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in InternationalLegal Scholarship, 106 AM.J. INT'L

L. 1, 19-25 (2012); Simmons, Treat Compliance, supra note 2, at 288-92.
14. See SrMMONs, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 59-64; see also POSNER,

supra note 2, at 22.
15. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52
(Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
16. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49
(Dec. 16, 1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
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Discrimination (CERD);17 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); 18 the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT);19 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 20
Testing whether the ratification of these core human rights treaties
improves human rights practices requires finding reliable measures of rights
protections to use as a dependent variable. This has proven to be an
exceedingly difficult task, however, because there are few human rights
practices that are measured consistently across a wide range of countries
and over a long period of time. This has resulted in scholars using a broad
range of dependent variables in their statistical analyses. In an early study on
the ICCPR, Camp-Keith used data published by Freedom House on the
levels of freedoms in different countries. 21 In a later study, Hathaway
engaged in a wide-ranging data collection effort to find novel dependent
variables, including counting the number of women in national legislatures
and coding countries' rates of torture based on State Department reports. 22
More recently, empirical studies have primarily used the CIRI dataset
compiled by Cingranelli and Richards. 23 The CIRI dataset gives every
country a score for a number of different areas of human rights for each
year from 1981 to 2010. These scores are based on the coding of reports
written by the State Department and Amnesty International. Although the
CIRI dataset has a number of shortcomings, it has become the standard way
that scholars evaluate changes in human rights practices. 24
The results of some of the primary studies that have evaluated the
effectiveness of the core human rights agreements are summarized in Table
1. As Table 1 shows, the first four studies of the effectiveness of human
rights agreements-Camp-Keith, 25 Hathaway, 26 Hafner-Burton
17. G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014, at 47 (Dec.
21, 1965), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
18. G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (Dec.
18, 1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
19.

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197
(Dec. 10, 1984).
20. G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, at 166 (Nov.
20, 1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
21. Linda Camp-Keith, The United Nations InternationalCovenanton Civil andPoliticalRights: Does It
Make A Difference in Human JightsBehavior?, 36 J. PEACEi RES. 95 (1999).
22. Hathaway, supra note 2.

23. David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human RIghts
Data Project, 32 HuM. RTS. Q. 401 (2010).
24. It is worth noting that the political scientist Christopher Fariss recently introduced a dataset
that provides a measure of respect for human rights. See ChristopherJ. Fariss, Respectfor Human Rights

has Improved Over Time: Modeling the ChangingStandardofAccountahilit, 108 AM. POL. Scs. REv. 297 (2014).
25. Camp-Keith, supra note 21.
26. Hathaway, supra note 2.
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found that commitments to
Tsutsui, 27 and Neumayer28-either
international human rights agreements had no effect on rights practices, or
they found evidence that these agreements were associated with worse
human rights practices. Despite analyzing a number of different treaties
using a range of data sources and statistical techniques, these studies did not
find evidence that international human rights treaties have improved human
rights practices.
To our knowledge, the first research to produce empirical evidence that
ratification of international human rights agreements improves human
rights practices was provided in Beth Simmons's book-length treatment of
the topic. 29 Simmons used a range of statistical models to test the
effectiveness of thirteen human rights agreements (including four of the
core human rights agreements and several additional protocols). Simmons
found that although six of the agreements did not produce statistically
significant changes in human rights practices, there was evidence that seven
of the these agreements did. 30 This included finding that ratification of an
optional protocol of the ICCPR that bans the use of the death penalty was
associated with countries being more likely to abolish the death penalty; that
ratification of the CEDAW was associated with improving the ratio of girls
to boys in schools and governments self-reporting increased access to birth
control; and that ratification of the CRC was associated with lower rates of
31
child labor and higher rates of child immunization.
Although Simmons's research concluded that human rights agreements
have had a positive effect on rights outcomes, Simmons did not find
evidence that commitments to international agreements improved respect
for human rights in all cases. Instead, Simmons found either limited or no
evidence that autocracies or stable democracies improved their rights
practices, but her evidence suggested that partially democratic states
improved their human rights practices after ratifying international
agreements. Simmons argues that this is because ratification of international
agreements makes it easier for political actors to promote reforms through
32
the domestic political process.
27. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui,.Human Rights in a Globaligng World: The Paradox

of Empty Promises, 110 AM.J. Soc. 1373 (2005).
28. Eric Neumayer, Do InternationalHuman Rights Treaties Improve Respectfor Human Rights?, 49
CONFLICT RESOL. 925 (2005).
29. See SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.

J.
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Table 1: Primary Findingsof the Effect of Treaties on Human Rights Practices

HUMAN RIGHTS AGREEMENT

Null

CEDAW

ICESCR
-

Null

Worse

Null

-

-

HafnerBurton
Tsutsui
(2005)
Neumayer
(2005)

Worse

Worse

Worse

Worse

Worse

Worse

Worse

-

Simmons

Mixed

Mixed

Mixed

Mixed

Hill
(2010)

Worse

Worse

Mixed

-

-

-

Cole
(2013)

-

-

Mixed

Lupu
(2013a)

Null

Null

Better

-

-

-

CRC

Lupu
(2013b)

Mixed

-

-

-

-

Null

Null

CERD
-

CAT

-

ICCPR
CampKeith
(1999)
Hathaway

(2002)

-

-

&

Worse

Hill
Jones
(2014)

&

Fariss

Better

(2014)
Lupu
(2015)

Mixed

Null= No effect on rights protection;
Worse Worse rights protection;
Better Better rights protection;
Mixed Better rights under certain circumstances.

-

(2009)
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In the years since Simmons's book was released, several studies have
33
used new statistical techniques to reanalyze the question. A study by Hill
34
and two studies by Lupu used almost identical data and very similar
statistical techniques. Hill found that ratification of the ICCPR has resulted
in more physical integrity violations, and that ratification of the CAT is
associated with more torture. 35 Hill's study did suggest that ratification of
the CEDAW has improved respect for women's political rights, but that the
36
treaty has had no effect on women's social or economic rights.
Lupu's first study largely replicated the approach used by Hill, but it
used a new, sophisticated statistical technique to help address selection
effects. Lupu found that the ICCPR and CAT have had no effect on rights
protection (instead of making it worse, as Hill suggested), and that the
CEDAW has improved women's political, economic, and social rights. 37 In
a related paper, Lupu argued that human rights agreements may have an
38
effect when they are enforceable through the domestic political process.
To test this theory, Lupu reanalyzed the effects of the ICCPR and found
that the ICCPR is associated with improved freedoms of speech, religion,
and assembly and association. The paper further found, however, that the
ICCPR has not improved physical integrity rights.
However, it is worth noting that even for the studies that found
encouraging statistically significant improvements in human rights practices,
the size of the effect is quite modest. For example, the one positive result
that Hill 39 found was that ratification of the CEDAW improves women's
political rights, but his results suggest that the convention seems to have led
to roughly a two percent decrease in the chance that states would be
classified as the most oppressive by the CIRI dataset, and a five percent
increase in the probability that states would be in the best category. Other
studies that found positive effects did not quantify them in a clear way,
leaving ambiguous whether the effects were substantively important. It is
important to note that statistically significant changes in rights practices are
not necessarily substantively large changes in rights protection.
To get a sense of magnitudes, consider the graphs in Figure 1. These
graphs show the trends in human rights practices in a particular country in
the five years before and after ratifying three major human rights
agreements. The first three panels of Figure 1 use data from the CIRI
33. Hill, supra note 2.
34. Lupu, The Informative Powerof Treay Commitment, supra note 2; Lupu, Best Evidence, supra note 2.
35. Hill, supra note 2.
36. Id. See also Wade M. Cole, Government Respectfor Gendered Rights: The Effect of the Convention on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on Women's FIghts Outcomes, 1981-2004, 57
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 233 (2013) (finding some evidence that CEDAW had a
positive effect on women's political rights).
37. Lupu, The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment, supra note 2.
38. Lupu, Best Evidence, supra note 2.
39. Hill, supra note 2.
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project, which scores countries' protection of a number of human rights.
The CIRI project scores countries in each year as 0 if there are frequent
rights violations, 1 if there are occasional rights violations, and 2 if there are
no reported rights violations. Upward trends are thus associated with
improved rights practices.
Panel 1 examines changes in four important rights in the years before
and after ratification of the ICCPR and shows that there is very little
noticeable improvement in countries' rights protection after the treaty goes
into effect. Panel 2 repeats the same exercise with the ratification of the
CEDAW, and only finds evidence that there is a positive trend in women's
political rights. This finding is consistent with Hill, who found a positive
effect of CEDAW ratification on women's political rights, but not on
women's economic or social rights. 40 It is important to note that the data
reveals an upward trend in women's political rights before countries ratify
the CEDAW, and ratification does not appear to accelerate the rate of
improvement. Panel 3 shows that after ratification of the CAT, protection
from torture does not improve (and is actually slightly worse). This result is
consistent with a number of studies-from Hathaway to Lupu-that have
not found evidence that the ratification of the CAT reduces torture rates.
Panel 4 repeats the same exercise for ratification of the CAT, but does
not use the CIRI data. Fariss recently used a variety of data sources to create
a composite measure of latent rights protection. 41 The measure-which we
will refer to as the Human Rights Score-combines information from a variety
of data sources into a single composite measure of human rights repression
by using a dynamic modeling process that accounts for temporal biases in
reporting on human rights over time. The Human Rzghts Score dataset looks
at 197 countries' human rights practices from 1949 to 2010. The human
rights practices in question are those that relate to political repressionextrajudicial killing, torture, censorship, and the like. Thus, the Human Rights
Score can be taken as a rough measure of a country's compliance with the
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, which bars those
activities.
40. Id.
41. See Fariss, supra note 24. See also Keith E. Schnakenberg & Christopher
Patterns ofHuman 14zghts Practices, 2 PoL. SCI. RES. & METHODS 1 (2014).

J.

Fariss, Dynamic
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Fgure 1: Human Rights PracticesBefore & After Treaty Ratification
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deviations that it is away from 0. For example, North Korea and South
Sudan both had a Human Rights Score of roughly -2 in 2010, which indicates
that they are both two standard deviations worse that the average level of
repression of all countries in the world over all years between 1949 and
2010. The United States has a score of 0.4 for 2010, which is slightly better
than the dataset's average. Iceland and Luxembourg are at the top of the list
in 2010, with scores of roughly 4. We use the 2010 Human Rights Scores for
each country in most of our figures. 42 In addition to correcting for biases in
other commonly used data sources, Fariss's measure has the useful quality
that, unlike most other data sources, it is continuous rather than
dichotomous or ternary. This makes the data more useful for regressions

and graphical representation.
Using this data, Fariss argues that rights have improved over the last
thirty years and moreover, that countries that have ratified the CAT have
43
lower rates of rights violations than those that do not. The evidence in
Panel 4 is consistent with Fariss's claim that rights protections have
improved slightly after countries ratify the CAT.44 It is worth noting,
however, that the trend emerges before countries ratify the CAT. Fariss's
data may simply be picking up improvements over time that are not
attributable to international treaties.
Despite the sophistication of the statistical techniques used by scholars,
issues of causation dog this research. It is difficult to know whether the
45
upward trends are driven by treaty ratification or omitted variables. One
cannot reject all possible theories that human rights treaties improve human
rights performance. It is possible that improvements in human rights lag
ratification by ten, twenty, or fifty years. It is also possible that treaties work
together rather than individually, thus affecting the behavior of
governments only if governments ratify more than a threshold number of
treaties or only if more than a threshold number of governments ratify
human rights treaties. Treaties may also improve human rights only if the
46
right conditions-institutional or otherwise-exist in a country.
We should also mention several additional types of studies that have
shed light on the relationship between human rights treaties and the
behavior of governments. First, recent research has tested whether states
receive rewards for ratifying international human rights agreements. One
42. The two exceptions are Figures 11 and 13, in which we use data on women's rights from the
CIRI project. For information on the CIRI project, see Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 23. See also
David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Measuring the Level, Pattern, andSequence of Government Respect
for Psychicallntegrity Rights, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 407 (1999) [hereinafter Cingranelli & Richards, Measuring

the Levelj.
43. See Fariss, supra note 24.

44. Id.
45. See Eric A. Posner, Some Skeptical Comments on Beth Simmons's Mobilingfor Human Rights, 44

N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 819 (2012).
46. See SIMMONS, MOBIL1ZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2.
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theory that has been put forward to explain why states would commit
themselves to international human rights agreements is that those states may
receive benefits from powerful countries like the United States and
members of the European Union. To test this theory, Nielsen and Simmons
examined whether states receive either tangible rewards (international aid,
trade agreements, or investment agreements) or intangible rewards (praise by
powerful countries and NGOs) after ratifying the ICCPR or the CAT.47
Their research found "almost no evidence" that states receive tangible or
intangible rewards after ratifying international human rights treaties. 48
Second, two recent studies have tested whether countries that ratify
international human rights agreements are more likely to include rights
protections in their national constitutions. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons
tested whether constitutions written after the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the ICCPR include rights similar to those agreements. 49
Their study found evidence that national constitutions written after these
agreements did include similar rights to those agreements, and that this
effect was stronger for countries that had ratified the ICCPR.s0 Their study
thus suggested that international human rights agreements might produce
changes in domestic law.51 More recently, Versteeg tested whether prior
ratification of seven major human rights agreements makes countries more
likely to include the rights codified in those agreements in their national
constitutions. 52 She found that the only treaties that have had a statistically
significant effect on the rights included in national constitutions are the
CAT and the additional protocol to the ICCPR on the death penalty.53 In a
separate study, Law and Versteeg found that constitutional protections are
often "shams"-they are not actually enforced, and so abuses are not
stopped. 54 If human rights treaties improve paper constitutional protections
that are not enforced, then the treaties can hardly be regarded as successful.
Third, a number of empirical studies have examined whether states that
violate human rights are punished by having the foreign aid they receive
from other countries reduced. Nielsen tested whether violations of physical
integrity rights reduced the amount of foreign aid that 118 developing
countries (including both ratifiers and non-ratifiers of human rights
47. Richard A. Nielsen & Beth A. Simmons, Rewardsfor Ratification: Payoff for Partiipatingin the
InternationalHumanRights Regime, 59 INT'L STUD. Q. 197 (2015).

48. Id.
49. Zachary Elkins et al., Getting to Rzghts: Treaty Ratificaion, ConstitutionalConvergence, and Human
Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 61 (2013).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. ila Versteeg, Law versus Norms: The Impact ofInternationalHuman-Rghts Treaties on NationalBills
of Rights, 171 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 87 (2015). See also Adam Chilton & Mila
Versteeg, The Failureof ConstitutionalTorture Prohibitions,44 J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (2016).

53. Id
54. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REv. 863 (2013).
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55
agreements) received from seventeen different OECD donors. Nielsen
did find that donors impose aid sanctions as a result of human rights
56
violations, but that these sanctions are imposed selectively. However, he
found "virtually no evidence" that states sanction human rights violators
because of normative commitments to human rights protection on the part
of the sanctioning states.57 Instead, Nielsen found that states were willing to
ignore human rights norms when the violations were committed by the
58
donors' allies.

Fourth, scholars have also tried to test the effectiveness of international
human rights law through survey experiments.5 9 The motivation behind
these studies is that one mechanism that has been proposed to explain why
ratification of international human rights agreements may have an effect is
that ratification increases domestic political support for improved rights
practices. The idea is that in countries that are at least partially democratic,.
citizens will become more supportive of human rights after learning their
government has made an international commitment, and this support will
compel leaders to make policy changes. Survey experiments have tested this
idea by providing samples of American respondents with information on a
policy that violates international human rights standards and randomly
providing some respondents with information on prior human rights
commitments. Using this approach, one of us (Chilton) found that
information on international law increased support for reforming solitary
confinement practices by about four percent, 60 and Wallace found that
references to international law dropped support for the use of torture by
about six percent. 61 These studies have limitations. Most notable is the fact
that there is not yet evidence showing that modest changes in public support
for improving human rights are likely to translate to changes in public
policy.
55. Richard A. Nielsen, Rewarding Human Risghts? Selective.Aid Sanctions Against Repressive States, 57

INT'L STUD. Q. 791 (2013).
56. Id. at 797-800.
57. Id. at 791.
58. Id.
59. For more information on this method, see Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, Why the Study of
InternationalLaw Needs Experiments, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173 (2013). Studies that have tested
the effectiveness of human rights treaties using experiments include: Adam Chilton, The Influence of
Intemational Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion:An ExperimentalStud, 15 CHI. J. INT'L L. 137
(2014) [hereinafter Chilton, The Influence ofInternationalHuman RightsAgreements]; Geoffrey P.R. Wallace,
InternationalLaw and Public Attitudes Toward Torture:An ExperimentalStudy, 67 INT'L ORG. 105 (2012)
[hereinafter Wallace, InternationalLaw]; Tonya L. Putnam & Jacob N. Shapiro, Does InternationalLaw
Affect Willingness to Punish Foreign Human Rights Abusers? (Working Paper Jul. 11, 2009) , available at
9
2
2
http://www.princeton.edu/-jns/papers/PutnamShapiro_- 00 _.W P.pdf; Michael Tomz, Reputation
Paper Feb. 2008), available at
(Working
Beliefs
and
on
Preferences
Law
and the Effect of International
8 2
2
http://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/Tomz-IntlLaw- 00 -0 -11 a.pdf.

60. Chilton, The Influence ofInternationalHuman Rights Agreements, supra note 59, at 128 n.71.
61. Wallace, InternationalLaw, supra note 59, at 119.
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B. Development
Development economics attempts to explain why some countries have
become richer than others. 62 An early strand of that literature argued that
economic development is simply a function of good policies. 63 For example,
one country might be richer than another because the government of the
first country has built infrastructure such as roads and canals, or has avoided
ruinous wars, or has avoided excessive taxation that destroyed incentives to
work. In the case of newly independent countries, poverty may result from
lack of education and insufficient capital. To the extent that these theories
are true, policy prescriptions for advancing economic development of poor
countries are straightforward. Those countries simply need to build
infrastructure, reform the tax system, increase education, and so on. Foreign
countries can help by providing technical assistance, cash, and loans. 64
This view has always had its skeptics. 65 It seems too simple to say that
all a government in a poor country has to do is adopt sensible policies that
the rich world has already figured out. Moreover, the actual efforts to help
poor countries with technical assistance and loans have yielded
disappointing results: foreign aid-whether direct aid, loans, or technical
assistance-does not appear to advance economic growth systematically
and robustly. 66 These findings raise the question whether economic growth
rates might be determined by factors that are outside the immediate control
of policymakers.
And, indeed, the view that wealth is rooted in the natural or historical
conditions of a country has long been influential. One idea, which goes back
centuries, is that countries with a better climate, more natural resources, and
similar favorable natural endowments should be wealthier than countries
that lack these resources. 67 This idea lost favor as it became clear that some
countries that lack natural endowments have become very wealthy-Japan,
for example.
But recent work that uses statistical analysis has found that, as a general
pattern, countries with more favorable geographic conditions are wealthier.
As Figure 2 shows, countries at higher or lower latitudes have a temperate
climate more suitable for agriculture than countries near the equator, and
62. For a recent survey, see Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep.Are the Foots, supranote 7, which we
use to organize our discussion here.
63. See, e.g., RONALD I. MCKINNON, MONEY AND CAPITAL IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(1973) (attributing low rates of development among poor countries to poor policy choices).
64. See, e.g., Paul Collier & David Dollar, Can the World Cut Poverly in Half? How Poliy Reform and
InternationalAidCan Meet InternationalDevelopment Goals, 29 WORLD DEV. 1787 (2001).
65. For a discussion, see William Easterly, NationalPoliies and Economic Growth: A Reappraisal,in
HANDBOOK VOLUME 1A, supra note 4, at 1015.
66. See supra note 10.
67. See, e.g., CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (THOMAS NUGENT,
TRANS., 2011) (speculating in 1748 about the relationship between geography and national wealth).

2016]

229

HISTORY'S INFLUENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANCE

they are wealthier. Countries with a lower percentage of their land area in
the tropics are wealthier. Landlocked countries and countries that lack
navigable rivers are poorer than other countries because of limited access to
trade. Countries with naturally occurring flora and fauna appropriate for

agriculture and animal husbandry are wealthier than countries without them.
The positive correlation between geographic favorability within a country
and its modern-day per capita income is robust.68
Figure 2: Latitude ' Gross Domestic ProductPer Capita in 2010
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The geographic theory of economic development has been challenged
on various grounds. One source of discomfort with it is that it implies that
the relative wealth of countries should never change (putting aside
expansion through conquest and union). Yet the relative wealth of countries
has varied considerably over the centuries. Indeed, the relative wealth of
countries in 1500 A.D.-as proxied by population density-is negatively
correlated to their relative wealth today.69 China, for example, had one of
the leading economies from ancient times until the nineteenth century and
then became a poor country until quite recently. While Latin American and
North American countries had about equal resources when colonized by
Europeans, today the North American countries are significantly
wealthier. 70 Moreover, some evidence indicates that countries with
68. See Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 328-31.
69. Id at 332-34. For some groups of countries, there is no telationship.
70. Stanley L. Engetman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Difeirential
Paths of Growth among New WTorld Economies: A View from Economic Historiansof the United States, in How
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abundant resources are subject to the "resource curse"-low economic
growth despite abundant resources as a result of battles between groups for
control of the resources, among other problems. 7
These observations have led to a new line of research (albeit with roots
in the 1970s) 72 that focuses on the quality of institutions as they have
developed over time. Differences in institutional quality may explain why
some countries benefit from natural resources while others succumb to the
resource curse. 73 The most famous institutional argument is Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson's (AJR) institutional transplant argument.74 They
claim that when Europeans colonized other parts of the world, they
sometimes, but not always, transplanted their institutions into their colonies.
AJR hypothesize that Europeans constructed low-quality institutions when
they sought merely to extract resources, and high-quality institutions when
they sought to engage in long-term investment. Extraction was used when
resources were abundant and easy to access while environmental conditions
were too harsh for colonists to survive for a long period of time. Otherwise,
settlers invested for the long term by transplanting their legal, political, and
economic institutions.

While AJR's empirical work has been criticized,75 their paper set off a
flurry of research on the historical origins of institutions. As we will discuss
in greater detail in Part II, researchers discovered a range of correlations
between conditions in the distant past and measures of institutional quality
today. The wealthier countries hundreds of years ago tend to be the
wealthier countries today, even controlling for geographic conditions. 76 A
likely reason for this "lag" effect is that the present wealth is generated by
institutions that persist or reproduce themselves over time. Other work
suggests that norms, institutions, and practices that emerged in very
different economic conditions hundreds of years ago tend to persist-to be
maintained by populations even when they migrate. For example, one study
suggests that agricultural societies in which the plow was used because of
the nature of the soil and the crops that could grow in it tended to have
LATIN AMElUCA FELL BEHIND: ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORIES OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO,

1800-1914, 260 (1997).

&

71. See Morrison, supranote 9.
72. LANCE E. DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN
ECONOMIC GRowrH (1971).
73. See Morrison,supra note 9, at 56--57.
74. Daron Acemoglu et al., The ColonialOngins of ComparativeDevelopment: An Empiricallnves gation,
91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001) [hereinafter Acemoglu et al., The ColonialOngins]; Daron Acemoglu
et al., Reversal of.Fortune: GeograpIy andInstitutions in the Making ofthe Modern World Income Distribution,117
Q. J. ECON. 1231 (2002) [hereinafter Acemoglu et al., Reversal ofFortune].
75. See David Y. Albouy, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An EmpiricalInvestegation:
Comment, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 3059 (2012) (criticizing); Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Ongins of
Comparative Development: AnEmpiricallnveszgation: Reply, 102 AM. ECON. REv. 3077 (2012) (defending).
76. See Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 326 n.2; Quamrul Ashraf
Oded Galor, Dynamics and Stagnation in the MalthusianEpoch, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 2003 (2011).
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unequal gender norms (because men were needed to drive the plow, and so
77
women were confined to the home) that have persisted for centuries.

Agricultural societies that did not use the plow and so employed female
labor in the fields generated more equal gender norms that have also
persisted despite radically different economic circumstances that prevail
today.78 In a related vein, a study found that areas in Africa that were raided
by slavers in the 1800s are poorer today than those areas that were notsuggesting that the slave raids destroyed institutions that minimized conflict
79
and supported economic cooperation.
In another line of research, scholars have investigated whether
migration and the composition of populations have influenced long-term
economic development. One might think that institutional advantages that
arise in one country would erode over time as populations in other countries
imitated them. Substantial empirical evidence shows that norms and.
80
Why doesn't
institutions diffuse across populations and countries.
in
the
past?
from
centuries
advantages
eliminate
diffusion
An intuitive explanation is that geographical barriers such as bodies of
water and mountain ranges isolate populations and block or slow down
diffusion. 8 ' We discussed that theory above. Spolaore and Wacziarg use
genetic distance as a proxy for remoteness. 82 Because populations with more
distant common ancestors are geographically more remote from each other,
genetic distance serves as a proxy for cultural distance. The authors provide
77. Alberto Alesina et. al, On the Orzgins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough, 128

Q.J. EcON.

469

(2013).
78. For other papers that find correlations between measures of the well-being of women today
and remote historical conditions, see Gilles Duranton et al., Famiy Types and the Persistence of Regonal
Disparitiesin Europe, 85 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 23 (2009) (medieval family structure); Melanie Meng Xue,
Textiles and the Historical Emergence of Gender Equality in China (Mar. 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Virginia journal of International Law Association) (textile production);
Gautam Hazarika et al., The Role of Historical Resource Constraints in Modern Gender Inequality: A
Cross-Country Analysis (Aug. 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia journal of
International Law Association) (resource scarcity); Pauline Grosjean & Rose Khattar, It's Raining Men!

Hallelujah? (Apr. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia journal of International
Law Association) (population sex ratios).

79. Nathan Nunn, The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades, 123 Q. J. ECON. 139 (2008). For

related work that shows that a history of slavery is correlated with low levels of well-being or with
human rights violations today, see Daron Acemoglu, Camilo Garcia-jimeno & James A. Robinson,

Finding Eldorado: Slavery and Long-Run Development in Colombia, 40 J. COMP. ECON. 534 (2012) (finding
that in Columbia a history of slavery is positively correlated with bad performance on current indicators
of well-being, like poverty, school enrollment, and vaccination); Graziella Bertocchi & Arcangelo
Dimico, Slavery, Education, and Inequality, 70 EUR. ECON. REV. 197 (2014) (finding that in the United
States a history of slavery is positively correlated with current economic inequality); Warren Whatley

& Rob Gillezeau, The Impact ofthe TransatlanticSlave Trade on EthnicStratficationin Africa, 101 AM. ECON.
REv. 571 (2011) (finding that in Africa a history of slavery is positively correlated with current ethnic
fragmentation).
80. See KATERINA LINos, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: How
HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWs SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013).
81. See Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots, supranote 7, at 328-31.
82. Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, The Diffusion ofDevelopment, 124 Q.J. ECON. 469 (2009).
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evidence that genetic distance from the U.S. population is negatively
correlated with economic growth. In related work, Ashraf and Galor show
that population diversity itself is related to economic growth. Populations
with very high and very low levels of genetic diversity are poorer than
populations with mid-level genetic diversity. Ashraf and Galor argue that
too much diversity interferes with governance while too little diversity is bad
for the economy. 83 The wealth of countries today reflects paths of migration
thousands of years ago.
While all of this research has been hotly debated, a consensus does seem
to be forming that geography matters for economic growth, both directly
and by virtue of its effect on institutions, and that history, including remote
history, also matters a great deal. The quality of institutions changes slowly
over time, and so the quality of institutions today is heavily influenced by
historical factors over which policymakers have no control. The research,
while fascinating, has an unsettling implication: that efforts to help countries
improve their rate of economic growth will be constrained by significant
exogenous factors. The reason that development assistance has failed to
promote economic growth in foreign countries may be that economic
growth in those countries is chiefly a function of historical and geographic
influences that development assistance cannot affect.

C Compatring the Literatures
It should be clear by now that the development literature has devoted
considerably more attention to historical and geographic conditions than
the human rights literature has. The focus has been driven in part by
methodological questions related to the difficulty with using statistical
analysis to show causation. Scholars have understood for a long time that
wealthier countries have better institutions, but until recently they could not
determine the direction of causality: whether good institutions cause wealth
or wealth causes good institutions. However, history provides a way out of
this puzzle. Because wealth today cannot cause favorable geographic
conditions or advanced technology in 1500 A.D., correlations between
wealth today and those factors strongly suggest that the direction of
causality goes from those factors to wealth, rather than vice versa.
Institutions-or at least, historical conditions-matter for economic
development.
Human rights researchers have also struggled with the problem of
causation. Does ratification of human rights treaties cause countries to
improve human rights, or does the improvement of human rights, occurring
because of changes in social norms or wealth or some other factor, cause
83. Quamrul Ashraf & Oded Galor, The "Out ofAfrica" Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diversit, and
ComparativeEconomic Development, 103 AM. ECON. Riv. 1 (2013).
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countries to ratify human rights treaties? So far, researchers have put
relatively little effort into determining the direction of causality, no doubt
because until recently most studies found no correlations. 84
Regardless of whether human rights treaties cause improvements in
human rights, they clearly cannot be the whole story. After all, many
countries provided far greater protection for human rights before the
international human rights regime was created than dozens of countries did
after they ratified the various human rights treaties. In Part III, we turn to
alternative explanations.
III. HYPOTHESES
Our conjecture that geographic and historical factors affect countries'
modern-day human rights performance is inspired by the findings of the
development literature. Both economic development and respect for rights
may be outcomes of the same underlying factors-for example, cultural
traditions that favor respect for individuals, high-quality institutions for
resolving disputes, well-functioning political institutions, isolation from
hostile foreign countries, remoteness from sources of cultural or
institutional diffusion, or abundant natural resources that limit the sources
of conflict. In the following sections, we explore these ideas by describing
selected hypotheses from the development literature; suggesting reasons the
hypotheses might apply to human rights performance as well as economic
development; and providing some initial evidence bearing on those
hypotheses. 85 To be clear, this is just initial evidence. We do not use
regressions to control for other factors, but just examine the correlations
between the factors identified by these hypotheses and human rights
practices. Except where otherwise indicated, our dependent variable is
86
Fariss's Human Rights Score.
84. See, e.g., Neumayer, supra note 28 (trying to account for the endogenous relationship between
treaty ratification and compliance by using Heckman models); SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 2 (using instrumental variable regression); Hill, supra note 2; Lupu, The Informatiie
Powerof Treaty Commitment, supra note 2; Lupu, Best Evidence, supra note 2; Lupu, Legislative Veto Players,
supra note 2 (all using matching techniques).
85. We rely on a recent survey piece on development economics, and organize our paper roughly
in the same way that this paper is organized for ease of comparison. See Spolaore & Wacziarg, How
Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7. We provide correlations and statistical significance for all our tests in
the appendix.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 24.
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A. Geography and Climate
Economists have long speculated that geographic and climatic
conditions affect economic development. Countries with temperate
climates, abundant natural resources, and favorable conditions for trade (for
example, access to the sea) should be wealthier than those that lack these
advantages. We consider whether two geographic features-latitude and
access to water-can help to explain human rights practices.

1. Latitude
Geographic advantages, as proxied by distance from the equator
(latitude), whether a country is landlocked, whether it is an island, and the
percentage of a country's area in the tropics, account for as much as fortyfour percent of a country's log per capital income in 2005.87 The causal
explanation for this correlation is hotly contested.88 Some scholars argue
that geographic advantages directly generate wealth;89 others argue that
geographical advantages favor high-quality institutions, which generate
wealth. 90 Regardless of the explanation, regression results provide strong
evidence for the correlation between latitude and current wealth. 91
Figure 3 provides a visual test of our first hypothesis, which is that
countries with more temperate climates have higher Human Rights Scores than
countries with less temperate climates. Our independent variable is the
absolute value of latitude.92 A higher value represents greater distance from
the equator, which (roughly) indicates a more temperate climate. As Figure
3 shows, countries with a more temperate climate also have stronger human
rights. To be more exact, the correlation between these two variables is 0.32,
and it is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The evidence is consistent
with the geographic hypothesis that human rights flourish in countries with
favorable geographic conditions.
87. Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep Air the Roots, supra note 7, at 328.

88. Id. at 327.
89. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs, Andrew D. Mellinger, & John L. Gallup, The Geography of Pover* and
lWealth, SC. AM., Mar. 2001, at 71; William A. Masters & Margaret S. McMillian, Climate and Scale in
Economic Growth, 6J. ECON. GROWTH 167 (2001).
90. See, e.g., Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Orgins, supra note 74.
91. See generally Spolaore & Wacziarg, Bow Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 328 Table 1.
92. This data is from the Global Development Network Growth Database, available at
http://www.nyudri.org/resources/global-development-network-growth-database/
(last visited Feb.

27, 2015).
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Figure3: Latitude and Human Rzghts Score
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2. Access to Water
Economists have also measured advantageous geography by using sea
access as a proxy. 93 Countries with ample territory that is close to a river or

ocean can more easily exploit maritime resources and trade with other
countries than can countries that are landlocked. As a result, empirical
studies have consistently found that variables that measure access to
94
waterways are highly correlated with economic outcomes.
It is also plausible that access to water would affect current levels of
respect for human rights. This could simply be because access to water will
have a current effect on countries' levels of wealth, which in turn is likely to
lead to higher rates of respect for human rights. Alternatively, it may be the
case that access to water increases respect for human rights by facilitating
the spread of ideas and cultures. Regardless of the mechanism, the clear
hypothesis is that variables that measure access to rivers and oceans should
have a positive relationship to current human rights practices.
93. See, e.g., Ashraf & Galor, supra note 76, at 2016.
94. See, e.g., Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 328.
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Figure 4: Access to Water and Human Rzghts Score
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Figure 4 shows the relationship between human rights and two
measures of water access.95 As the top panel shows, human rights are
&

95. Both variables are from Ashraf & Galor's dataset on development economics. Ashraf
data
is
publically
available
at
Galor,
supra
note
76.
This
(last
https://drive.google.com/file/d/Bw~xeVVYEG5XTTBSbTRHdGdiMnc/edit?usp=sharing
visited Aug. 7, 2015).
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stronger in countries that are close to a coast or a river than in countries
that are landlocked. Mean distance to a coast or river has a -0.27 correlation
with the Human Rights Score, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
In other words, the more of a country's territory that is far from oceans or
rivers, the worse its human rights practices are likely to be. The bottom
panel also shows that human rights are stronger in countries with a higher
percentage of land within 100 kilometers of a coast or river. The relationship
has a 0.40 correlation with the Human Rights Score, which is also statistically
significant at the 0.001 level. Thus, both variables that measure access to
water are highly correlated with current human rights practices, which is
consistent with the geographic hypothesis that human rights flourish in
countries with favorable geographic conditions.
3. Conclusion
In sum, we find correlations between geographic factors and human
rights abuse. Repression and other human rights violations occur more
frequently in countries with harsh environmental conditions than in
countries with more favorable geographic conditions.
B.

InstitutionalTransplant

Another theory is that the historical quality of institutions determines
economic development.9 6 One version of this theory is what we call the
"institutional transplant" theory, which holds that the economic growth rate
of a former colony is a function of the institutions transplanted to it by an
imperial power. We explore the relationship between two variables that are
used as proxies for the institutional transplant theory-settler mortality and
the European share of the population-and current human rights practices.
1. SettlerMortality
AJR argue that current differences between countries' levels of wealth
can be explained largely by the quality of their institutions. AJR further argue
that high-quality institutions are not created overnight. Instead, whether a
country has high-quality institutions now is heavily influenced by the quality
of their institutions hundreds of years ago. As a measure of institutional
quality hundreds of years ago, AJR used the settler mortality rates in
countries colonized by Europe because colonizers did not establish highquality institutions in places that were hazardous to their health. After
estimating a number of different regressions, AJR found strong evidence
7
that settler mortality is negatively associated with countries' current wealth.'
96. See, e.g., Acemoglu et al., The ColonialOngins, supra note 74.
97. Id.; Acemoglu et al., Reversalof.Fortune, supra note 74.
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Similarly, it may be the case that the human rights performance of
former colonies can be traced to institutional transplants. One of the major
findings of the empirical human rights literature is that institutions can
influence the effectiveness of human rights protections. For example, one
paper found that the presence of an independent judiciary increases the
likelihood that human rights will be protected.98 Another study found that
countries with legislative veto players are more likely to comply with their
human rights commitments.9 9 Both of these findings suggest that highquality institutions should be associated with better human rights
performances, and the quality of these institutions may have deep historical
roots. The clear hypothesis that this suggests is that, in former colonies
outside of Europe, human rights should be stronger in countries that
received higher-quality institutions from their colonial overlords.
Figure 5: SettlerMortalit and Human Rights Score
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Figure 5 shows the relationship between the key variable used by AJR
to measure institutional quality-the log of settler mortality at the time of
colonization 0 0-and countries' Human Rights Scores. As the figure clearly
shows, higher rates of settler mortality are associated with worse human
rights in 2010. The log of settler mortality has a -0.34 correlation with
Human Rzghts Scores, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Unlike
98. See Lupu, Best Evidence, supra note 2.
99. See Lupu, Legislative Veto Players, supra note 2.
100. This variable is taken from AJR's replication dataset. Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Orngins,
supra note 74. This data is publically available at http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/acemoglu/data/ajr2001 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
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AJR, we do not try to show causation. Instead, these results are preliminary
evidence in support of the institutional transplant hypothesis.
2. European Share of the Population

Other scholars have investigated the institutional transplant hypothesis
by studying the relationship between the European share of the population
at the time of colonization and current economic wealth.' 0 ' Most notably,
Easterly and Levine found that European share of the population during
colonization is a statistically significant predictor of current wealth, even
when controlling for a number of other variables that measure state
history-like early- adoption of agriculture.1 02 Easterly and Levine have
argued that their results suggest the importance of the human capital that
03
was brought by early European settlers during colonization.1
As another way to explore the institutional transplant hypothesis, we
examined the relationship between human rights and the European share
04
of the population during colonization as a proxy for early institutions.1
The justification for doing so is that European settlers created institutions
in the areas they colonized, and that larger European populations created
more substantial institutions. The hypothesis is thus that there should be a
positive correlation between the European share of the population during
colonization and current human rights practices.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the European share of the
population at colonization and current Human Rights Scores. As Figure 6
shows, larger European shares at the time of colonization are associated
with better Human Rights Scores. The relationship between these two
variables has a correlation of 0.34, and is statistically significant at the 0.01
level. These results thus suggest that Easterly & Levine's argument about
the influence of institutions and human capital on current economic wealth
may also hold for current human rights practices.
101. See also Louis Putterman & David N. Weil, Post-1500 Population Flows and the Long-Run

Q. J.

ECON. 1627 (2010) [hereinafter Putterman

&

Determinantsof Economic Growth and Inequality, 125

Wel, Post-1500]; William Easterly & Ross Levine, The European Ongins ofEconomic Development (Working

Paper, 2014), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl8162.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). See
generally Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 338-41.

102. See Easterly & Levine, supra note 101.
103. Id.
104. This variable is from Easterly & Levine's dataset on economic development. See id. This data
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rosslevat
available
publically
is
ine/Papers/appendix-europeans_16oct2013.xls (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
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Figure 6. European Share of Population and Human Rights Scores
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3. Conclusion

The correlations we find are consistent with the hypothesis that human
rights receive greater protection in non-European countries that received
higher-quality institutions from imperial powers. Scholars have developed
other proxies for institutional quality that we address in the next section.
C

InstitutionalLag
Institutional transplant is a special case of what we called "institutional

lag," which refers to the idea that the quality of institutions today depends
on the quality of institutions in the past, for all countries, not just for those
that

have

received

transplants.

Researchers

who

have

studied

this

hypothesis have used various proxies to measure directly (albeit crudely) the
quality of the institutions in the past. We specifically explore the relationship
between three measures of institutional lag and current human rights
practices: (1) legal origins; (2) historical population density; and (3) state
centralization and the onset of agriculture.

1. Common La and Civil La
Many authors have argued that whether a legal system is rooted in the
common law or in civil law determines economic development.105 They
105. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Ie4gal Onigins, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1193 (2002).
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argue that because civil law was developed by relatively absolute monarchies
as a way to control the population through subordinate judges, civil law
systems favor centralization of power that disrupts markets. By contrast, the
common law was developed in a relatively decentralized system and
preserved the dispersion of power in institutions that featured independent
judges and an adversarial style of adjudication, which constrained the central
government and promoted markets. While the literature does not claim that
civil law systems are "lower-quality" than common law systems in an
inherent sense, it does claim that civil law systems lead to lower economic
06
growth, and there is some evidence for this hypothesis.
One might similarly argue that if civil law systems enhance the power
of central governments, they may also enhance its power to violate human
rights, and thus should lead to more human rights violations. A problem
with this argument is that the relationship between government
centralization and human rights is not obvious. Many human rights obligate
the government to intervene-to protect children from abuse, for example,
or to require employers to accommodate workers with disabilities, or to
abolish slavery-and such intervention may require a strong central
government with control over the courts, rather than a weak central
government.1 07 Nonetheless, the hypothesis is sufficiently plausible to be
worth exploring.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between countries' legal origins and
their current Human Rights Scores.108 In the top panel, countries are coded as
"1" if they have British legal origins (which is a standard measure of having
a common law tradition) and "0" otherwise. In the bottom panel, countries
are coded as "1" if they have French legal origins (which is a standard
measure of having a civil law legal tradition) and "0" otherwise. The figure
shows that having British legal origins is very weakly associated with better
Human Rights Scores, and that having French legal origins is very weakly
associated with worse Human Rights Scores.109 Both results are far from
statistically significant. Our preliminary analysis thus does not suggest a
relationship between legal origins and current human rights practices, but
obviously more research would have to be done to examine if a relationship
does exist.
106. Id. at 1197.
107. For this reason, a better approach would consider the range of policies that imperial powers
applied in their colonies rather than merely legal policy. For this argument, see Daniel M. Klerman,
Paul G. Mahoney, Holger Spamann, & Mark I. Weinstein, Legal Ongin or ColonialHistory?, 3 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIs 379 (2011).
108. The legal origins data is from the Global Development Network Growth Database, available
(last visited
at http://www.nyudri.org/resources/global-development-network-growth-database/

Feb. 27, 2015).
109. Our results are thus consistent with the findings in Sara McLaughlin Mitchell et al., Domestic
Legal Traditions and States' Human Rzghts Practices, 50 J. PEACE RES. 189 (2013), who, however, use as
their dependent variable a measure of political terror.
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Figure 7: Legal Origins and Human Rights Scores
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2. Population Density

Researchers have argued that population density in the past may be a
good proxy for the level of economic development at the time. 110 The
argument is based on the Malthusian insight that, before birth control,
economic growth should lead to a larger population. Population density in
&

110. See Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep Ae the Roots, supra note 7, at 327 n.3. See also Ashraf
Galor, supra note 76.
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the past could be interpreted directly as a measure of economic growth or
indirectly as a measure of the quality of economic institutions. Evidence
suggests that countries with the highest economic growth also had the
highest population density in 1500 A.D. and 1000 A.D., and so it has been
suggested that this is evidence of a long time lag in the quality of economic

institutions."'
Figure 8: PopulationDensity and Human Rights Scores
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One can construct a similar argument about human rights. Suppose that
population density in 1500 A.D. reflected the level of economic
111 Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 335.
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development, and the level of economic development reflected the quality
of economic institutions. One might further speculate that a country with
high-quality economic institutions also had high-quality legal and political
institutions, based on the plausible assumption that "economic institutions"
are just legal and political institutions that protect property rights and
enforce contracts. If the institutional lag hypothesis is correct, it would
follow that such countries would also have fewer human rights violations
today.
Figure 8 shows the relationship between past population density and
Human Rights Scores.112 The top panel shows the relationship between the log
of population density in 1000 A.D. and Human Rights Scores, and the bottom
panel shows the relationship between the log of population density in 1500
A.D. and Human Rights Scores. In contrast to existing research that finds a
positive relationship between past population density and current wealth,113
both panels show a very slight negative relationship between historical
population density and Human Rights Scores. That said, neither of these
correlations is statistically significant.
3. State CentraliZationand Onset ofAgriculture
Researchers have argued that state centralization and the number of
years since the adoption of agriculture may be proxies for institutional
quality. The research in this area addresses whether populations that migrate
bring their institutions (or human capital or other norms and values) with
them, so that the quality of institutions in a country depends on the quality
of institutions of the population that migrated to the country rather than the
quality of institutions that existed in that area before the migrants arrived.' 14
While state centralization and adoption of agriculture may seem like cruder
proxies for institutional quality than the others we have discussed, they have
the virtue that they can be traced back along the paths of popular migration.
This research finds some evidence for the hypothesis that populations that
experienced state centralization earlier and adopted agriculture earlier also
had higher quality institutions than other populations." 5
112 See Ashraf & Galor, supranote 76.
113. See Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 334.
114. See, e.g., Putterman & Weil, Post-1500, supra note 101; Valerie Bockstette, Areendam Chanda
& Louis Putterman, States andMarkets: The Advantage ofan Early Start, 7 J. EcON. GROWTH 347 (2002);
Areendam Chanda & Louis Putterman, Early Starts, Reversals and Catch-Up in the Process of Economic
Development, 109 SCANDINAVLAN J. EcON. 387 (2007) [hereinafter Chanda & Putterman, Early Starts].
115. Spolaore & Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots, supra note 7, at 338.
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Figure 9: State Centraligationand Human Rights Scores
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This hypothesis is at least superficially in tension with the hypothesis
that countries with civil law traditions are more likely to violate human rights
than are common law countries. The state centralization hypothesis suggests
that states with strong centralization respect human rights, while the legal
tradition hypothesis suggests that states with strong centralization violate
human rights. But there are different causal factors in play here. The state
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centralization hypothesis rests on a theory about the quality of institutions:
states with a history of powerful institutions are more likely to have highquality institutions than states with a history of anarchy. The legal tradition
hypothesis holds constant the quality of institutions and claims different
legal institutions influence a government's likelihood of respecting human
rights in different ways.
Figure 9 explores the relationship between two measures of early state
centralization and current human rights practices. 116 The independent
variable in the top panel is the number of years (measured in thousands)
since a country transitioned from hunting and gathering to agriculture. The
independent variable in the bottom panel is an index of a state's history that
measures the amount of state centralization prior to 1500 A.D. on a scale
of 0 to 1.117 Following Putterman and Weil, both the Agricultural Years and
State History variables are adjusted to account for migration.11 8 The
justification is that migrants bring the advantage of early centralization with
them when they move to new places, so the "adjusted variables measure the
average level of such advantages in a present day country as the weighted
average of [Agricultural Years or State History] in the countries of ancestry,
with weights equal to the population today."119 The top and bottom panels
reveal a positive relationship between early state centralization and current
human rights practices, but the relationships do not achieve statistical
significance.
4. Conclusion
Our data are consistent with the institutional lag hypothesis, but the
correlations are noticeably weaker than the geographic and institutional
transplant correlations. As is apparent in the figures, the correlations are
small and not statistically significant.1 20
D. HistoricalTechnologicalAdvantages
A related idea is that countries with technological advantages at an early
stage of their development receive a head start that allows them to enjoy
greater development today. We first explore this hypothesis directly and
116. The data for the independent variables in Figure 9 is from Putterman & Weil, Post-1500,
supra note 101. We would also like to thank C. Justin Cook for sharing data.
117. The State History variable is calculated using a complicated process that discounts years prior
to 1500 A.D. For more information on how the measure was created, see id. and Chanda & Putterman,
Early Starts, supranote 114.
118. Putterman & Weil, Post-1500, supra note 101.

119. Id. at 1642.
120. The exact correlations for all the variables shown in our figures are located in the
appendix.
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then consider a related hypothesis that historical technological adoption
may influence modern gender rights.
1. TechnologicalAdoption
Comin et al. test the relationship between "technological adoption" of
specific technologies in 1000 B.C., 0 A.D., and 1500 A.D. and the current
wealth of nations. 121 The variables for each time are composite indexes that
account for whether a country had adopted a number of "cutting edge"
technologies by that year. 122 For example, the technological index for 1500
A.D. measures whether a country had ships capable of crossing the Atlantic
Ocean or gunpowder-based weapons.1 23 Comin et al. find that technological
adoption in 1500 A.D. is a statistically significant predictor of modern GDP
per capita and technological adoption across countries.1 24 Moreover, the
authors find this relationship both in specific locations and, like Putterman
26
and Weil,125 for populations that have migrated from place to place.1 These
results suggest that population groups transmit institutions, norms, or skills
over generations, so that head starts are preserved over very long periods of
time. 127
Historical technological development could affect a government's
treatment of human rights' through various pathways. Advanced
technology-including technology for writing, recording, monitoring, and
so on-may enable a population to create sophisticated institutions- that
constrain government abuse of power and can protect people's interests. It
could also create an attitude of open-mindedness and willingness to tolerate
creative thought, which may in turn make people more tolerant of rights
and interests of others. To be sure, advanced technology may also enable a
government to oppress a population with greater effectiveness.
Figure 10 shows the relationship between early technological adoption
and current human rights practices. The top panel shows the relationship
between technological adoption in 0 A.D. and Human Rights Scores and the
bottom panel does so for technological adoption in 1500 A.D. As Figure 10
shows, higher rates of technological adoption in 0 A.D. are associated with
worse current human rights practices, but higher technological adoption in
1500 A.D. is associated with better human rights practices today. The
second result is consistent with the hypothesis, but the first result is hard to
explain. Neither correlation, however, is statistically significant.
121. Diego Comin et al., Was the Wealth of Nations Determined in 1000 B.C?, 2 AM. ECON.

MACROECON. 65 (2010).
122. Id at 74-75.
123. Id at 75.
124. Id. at 80.
125. Putterman & Wel, Post-1500, supra note 101.
126. Comin et al., supra note 121, at 81.

127. Id.

J.
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Figure 10: Technology Adoption and Human Rights Scores
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2. Agriculture Technology & Gender Ri~ghts
In a recent paper, Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn
(AGN) find evidence that agricultural technology in preindustrial societies
influences gender norms today.1 28 Ethnographic research suggests that
more rigid gender roles arose in farming communities that used the plow
than in farming communities that did not, perhaps because plow use, unlike
other agricultural practices, required upper-body strength possessed by men
and led to a farm-home division of labor. AGN find that more conservative
attitudes toward women and lower female participation in workplace,
128. Alesina et al., supra note 77.
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entrepreneurial, and (more weakly) political activities are found in modern
populations descended from communities that used the plow and that
existed in areas where agricultural conditions made plow use optimal.129
The AGN theory is based on cultural transmission: gender norms that
reflected economic practices hundreds of years ago have persisted in
populations, even though the underlying economic conditions have
changed. If correct, the AGN theory implies that compliance with the
CEDAW will be higher in countries with traditional plow use than in
countries that lack traditional plow use. In other words, adoption of the
plow hundreds of years ago should help to explain compliance with
contemporary international agreements on women's rights.
Figure 11 shows the relationship between traditional plow use and
current women's rights. Unlike the preceding figures, however, the
dependent variable in Figure 11 is not Human Ri.ghts Scores. This is because
the variable developed by Fariss is a composite measuring state repression
(like torture and extrajudicial killings) that does not try to capture women's
rights.1 30 For the dependent variable in Figure 11 we use data on women's
rights in 2010 from the CIRI dataset.131 The top panel shows the
relationship between traditional plow use and women's political rights, and
the bottom panel shows the relationship between traditional plow use and
women's economic rights.1 32 The top panel reveals no evidence of a
relationship between traditional plow use and current women's political
rights. The bottom panel, however, reveals a positive relationship between
traditional plow use and current women's economic rights that is statistically
significant at the 0.01 level.
The result for women's economic rights is consistent with AGN's
findings. We do not find similar results for political rights, mirroring to
some extent AGN's weaker results for that variable. One reason for this
may be that gender norms that develop in societies without traditional plow
use permit women to work outside the household but do not imply anything
about the role of women in politics. Transmission of these cultural norms
over generations could lead to societies in which women have more work
choices and can earn more money, but not necessarily to societies in which
women participate in politics.

129. Id.
130. See Fariss,supra note 24, at 301-04.
131. Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 23. This data is publicly available at
http://www.humantightsdata.com/ (last visited February 27, 2015). The CIRI dataset is commonly
used by empirical studies on the effectiveness of international law on women's rights. See, e.g., Lupu,
The Informative Powerof Treaty Commitment, supra note 1; Hill, supra note 2.
132. Both variables are measured on a scale of 0 to 3, with lower values associated with worse
women's rights practices. Although the dependent variable can only take on the values 0, 1, 2, or 3,
Figure 11 "jiggers" the values so that the country names will be easier to view. Jiggering the country
names does not, however, affect the slope of the fit line displayed.
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Figure 11: TraditionalPlow Use and Women's Rights
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3. Conclusion
Our analysis reveals inconsistent evidence about the relationship
between historical technological adoption and current human rights
practices. Our analysis of technology adoption in 1000 A.D. and 1500 A.D.
did not reveal a statistically significant relationship with current Human
Rghts Scores, but we did find a positive relationship between plow use and
measures of women's economic rights. This suggests that more research
should be done to explore whether historical technology adoption is related
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to current human rights practices generally or respect for women's rights
specifically.
E. The BarrierHypothesis
Recall that the barrier hypothesis was proposed to explain why
favorable institutions do not diffuse across countries. 133 The theory is that
natural barriers like mountains and oceans block the transmission of norms.
To test this hypothesis, Spolaore and Wacziarg collect data on the genetic
difference between populations.1 34 The easiest way to understand the
genetic difference variable is to see it as a measure of the extent to which
two populations share a common ancestry. Because of genetic drift, people
who share recent common ancestors have more similar DNA than people
who share only remote common ancestors. Spolaore and Wacziarg do not
claim that the genetic difference measures a population's ability to generate
wealth. 135 Instead, genetic difference is a proxy for cultural barrierslanguage, social norms, and so on--which will be greater between groups
that split from each other in the remote past than those that split from each
other more recently.1 36
The authors look at the genetic difference between countries and the
United States, and hypothesize that countries with a greater genetic
difference from the U.S. population will have lower per capita income than
countries that have smaller genetic differences from the United States. The
reason Spolaore and Wacziarg compare other countries to the United States
is because it is the world's "technological frontier."1 37 Using genetic
difference variables for the present, for 1500 A.D., and for other historical
periods, they find that genetic difference is negatively related to per capita
income.1 38 Countries with different populations are less likely to enjoy the
benefits of the dissemination of new technologies and innovations than
countries with similar populations.
The same idea may be true with human rights. The modern notion of
human rights originated in the Enlightenment in Western Europe.1 39 Over
the next two centuries, Enlightenment ideas emphasizing human rights
spread throughout the world. If the cultural barriers hypothesis is correct,
and if genetic difference is a proxy for cultural barriers, populations with
greater genetic distance should enjoy fewer human rights protections.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
134. Spolaore & Wacziarg, supra note 82.
135. Id. at 470 (noting that their findings "are not about some societies having some specific
genes that make them directly richer").
136. Id. at 482-86.
137. Id. at 487.

138. Id. at 488-89.
139. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 11.
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Figure 12: Genetic Distance to the U.S. andHuman Rights Scores
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Figure 12 shows the relationship between genetic distance to the United
States and countries' Human Rzhts Scores. In the top panel, the variable on
the x-axis is the genetic distance to the United States based on both
countries' populations in 1500 A.D. In the bottom panel, the variable on
the x-axis is the genetic distance to the United States based on both
countries' current populations, which accounts for migration patterns over
the last 500 years. For example, in 1500 A.D. the population of the United
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States comprised North Amerindians, but the current population consists
most of people of English descent. 140 In both panels, countries with farther
genetic distances from the United States have lower Human Rights Scores.
These results are both statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This suggests
that future research may productively benefit from applying Spolaore and
Wacziarg's methods to human rights.

F. The Influence of Human Rights Practicesin the Past
Finally, we look at how variables that measure human rights practices
in the past predict current rights practices. The major theme of the articles
we have discussed is that a country's economic development today is a
function of its economic development in the distant past. Countries do not
necessarily catch up with each other; advantages linger. To examine this
idea, the economic development literature focuses on variables that capture
historical economic conditions or geographic or demographic factors
thought to be relevant to historical economic conditions. As we have
argued, these factors may be relevant to human rights conditions today as
well.
But this theme also suggests that it would be fruitful to look at historical
human rights indicators. Consider again the argument that respect for
human rights is a cultural trait. Once the idea of human rights is introduced
in a country, it will gradually become entrenched in a population as it is
transmitted down to future generations. This argument suggests that respect
for human rights in the past predicts respect for human rights today. The
institutional arguments (including the lag and transplant arguments) have
the same implications. If human rights are most likely respected in countries
with high-quality institutions (or institutions of a certain type), and highquality institutions persist over time, then respect for human rights in the
41
past should predict respect for human rights today.1
Because collection of human rights data is a recent phenomenon, we
cannot use human rights data from the past to test this hypothesis. But we
can use historical data that indicates that a country has adopted norms, laws,
or practices that are consistent with what we now call human rights. We
consider two such factors: a country's history of women's rights and a
country's experience with slavery.
140. See Spolaore & Wacziarg, supra note 81, at 486.
141. For related arguments in the literature, see Paola Giuliano & Nathan Nunn, The Transmission
of Democracy: From the Village to the Nation-State, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 86 (2013), who find that modern
democracy indicators are higher in countries where ancestral populations in preindustrial times used
consensus to choose leaders, and lower in countries where leadership was inherited, and Nico
Voigtlinder & Hans-Joachim Voth, Persecution Pepetuated: The Medieval Ongins ofAnti-Semiic Violence in
NaZi Germany, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1339 (2011), who find that anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany was
greatest in areas where pogroms took place in the fourteenth century.
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Figure 13: Years Since Women's Suffrage and Women's Rights
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1. Women's Rights
First, we look at the year in which a country granted the franchise to
women. Our hypothesis is that countries that granted the franchise to
women in the distant past are more likely to respect a spectrum of women's
rights today than countries that granted the franchise more recently. This
hypothesis is based on the theory that cultural practices that are relatively
favorable for women in particular countries both ensure that the franchise
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is granted at a relatively early stage and that rights protections are granted
to women sooner rather than later.
Figure 13 shows the relationship between the years since women were
granted suffrage and current women's rights. This is the same women's
rights data from the CIRI dataset used in Figure 11.142 The top panel shows
the relationship between years since women's suffrage and women's
political rights, and the bottom panel shows the relationship between years
since women's suffrage and women's economic rights.1 43 In both panels,
there is a strong positive relationship between the year that women obtained
suffrage and current human rights practices. Both correlations are
statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
2. Legagy ofSlavery
Second, we look at the relationship between a country's experience with
slavery and its human rights performance today. We first do so by looking
at the relationship between the number of years since a country abolished
slavery and its Human Rights Scores.1 44 As the top panel in Figure 14 shows,
there is a positive and highly significant relationship between the year that a
country abolished slavery and its current levels of state repressions. In other
words, countries that were early adopters of good human rights practices
hundreds of years ago are still among the best countries today. 145
As another test of the relationship between a country's experience with
slavery and respect for human rights, we investigate whether a theory
developed by the economist Nathan Nunn about the impact that the legacy
of slavery has on economic growth also applies to human rights.1 46 Nunn
tests the theory that the slave trade damaged political institutions in affected
countries in Africa. Nunn examines the pattern of slave trading in Africa
from the 1400s to the 1900s and distinguishes populations that were more
significantly victimized by slave raids from those that were less affected.1 47
He finds that African countries today with lower economic growth are
142. See Cingranelli & Richards, supranote 23.
143. See note 132 for a description of the dependent variable and an explanation of how it is

graphed.
144. This data was collected for this project. The years since slavery was abolished variable was
calculated based on the years prior to 2010 that slavery was abolished (we chose 2010 because it is the
most recent year that our dependent variable-HumanRights Scos-is available). Countries where
slavery was not yet abolished in 2010 were coded as 0. We excluded from the data countries for which
we could not find any information on when slavery was abolished.
145. Cf Avidit Acharya, Matthew Blackwell, & Maya Sen, The Poliica/ Legag ofAmerican Slavey
(Mar. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law
Association) (finding that whites who live in Southern counties that had a high proportion of slaves in
1860 have more negative attitudes toward African-Americans today).
146. See Nunn, supra note 79.

147. Id. at 145-51.
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located in the areas where slave exportation was most common. 148 Nunn
argues that slave raids weakened government institutions, sowed distrust,
and created conflict that undermined institutional development in countries
that were most affected by them. 149
Figure 14: Legagy of Slavey and Human Rights Scores
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If Nunn's theory is right, African countries where slave exportation was
most common should also have low human rights scores today. We test this
hypothesis and graph the results in the bottom panel of Figure 14. The
bottom panel of Figure 14 indeed shows a negative relationship between
slave exports and human rights scores that is statistically significant at the
0.05 level. This suggests that, consistent with Nunn's theory, the destruction
of political institutions by the slave trade has had a lasting, negative impact
on human rights in those countries.
Nunn's theory focuses on the destructive effect of slave-trading on trust
and political institutions. Other scholars have proposed narrower pathways
of influence with more direct implications for human rights. Dalton and
Leung argue that slavery, by depleting the population of men in affected
societies, resulted in the rise of polygyny, which has persisted long after the
slave trade ended.15 0 Polygyny, in turn, is associated with worse human
rights outcomes for women than for men. Accordingly, it seems likely that
the governments of populations whose ancestors were victimized by the
slave trade will today have more trouble complying with the rights in the
CEDAW.

II. DIscussioN
Our exploratory analysis in the previous section suggests that the
hypotheses that have been generated by the development economics
literature may shed light on some of the variance in current human rights
practices. In this section, we discuss the implications of our exploration of
the data. First, we consider the relationship between economic growth and
human rights generally. Second, we explain how our arguments could be
extended from explaining civil and political rights to cultural, social, and
economic rights. Finally, we describe the relationship between our analysis
and previous studies on the effectiveness of human rights agreements.
A. The Relationship Between Economic Growth & Human Rights
Our evidence suggests that historical and geographic factors that are
correlated with national wealth are also correlated with human rights
protection. However, it has long been known that national wealth is
positively correlated with human rights protection.151 In fact, GDP is one
of the key independent variables that have become part of the "Standard
150. John T. Dalton & Tin Cheuk Leung, Why Is Polygyny More Prevalent in Western Africa? An
African Slave Trade Perspecive, 62 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 599 (2014).
151. See generally Hill & Jones, seara note 1.
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Model" to explain levels of government repression.1 52 So have we merely
confirmed this relationship, albeit indirectly?
No. First, all of the historical variables that we use in our analysis have
been shown by previous studies to have a statistically significant relationship
with current economic conditions in countries around the world. Our
analysis, however, revealed statistically significant correlations between only
nine of the seventeen variables and human rights performance.1 53 Thus, not
all historical variables that predict current national wealth also predict
current human rights practices.
Second, our results complicate the repression literature by suggesting
that wealth and respect for human rights are jointly caused by historical
factors. The repression literature does not untangle the direction of
causation between wealth and human rights. Indeed, while that literature
might seem to suggest that the best route to human rights protection is
wealth-which in turn suggests that free trade and economic development
are key for ending human rights abuses-our findings do not support such
an optimistic conclusion. Autocracies that discover natural resource
bonanzas do not necessarily convert into liberal democracies. They may
collapse into civil war (Congo), simply remain autocratic (Saudi Arabia), or
even become more autocratic (Venezuela).
Third, we have also provided initial evidence suggesting that historical
variables that have not previously been identified by the development
literature-like the year that countries granted suffrage to womenl 54 _are
strong predictors of current rights practices. The idea that cultural and
institutional determinants of human rights change very slowly is intuitive,
and yet it has been disregarded by the empirical human rights literature.
Future research should explore historical factors that have not yet been
identified.

B. Development & Social, Cultural, & Economic Rights
For most of our analysis, the dependent variable that we have used is
the Human Rights Score developed by Christopher Fariss,155 which is a
composite variable that measures a country's level of latent repression.1 56
All of the variables included in Fariss's model are measures of civil and
152. See Linda Camp Keith, C. Neal Tate & Steven C. Poe, Is the Law a Mere Parchment Barnerto

Human RightsAbuse?, 71

J. POL. 644,

648 (2009); see also Hill & Jones, supra note 1, at 661 (identifying

GDP as one of the "usual suspects" used to explain repression).
153. For a summary of our results, see the APPENDIX.
154. See supra PART III.F.1.
155. See Fariss, supranote 24.

156. Id. at 301.
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political rights. 157 They are accordingly a reasonable approximation of
compliance with the ICCPR.
However, the ICCPR is just one of numerous treaties. The ICESCR,
for example, protects a range of so-called positive rights, including rights to
housing, medical care, education, and welfare. While the ICESCR has
generated a huge doctrinal literature, scholars have tested none of its
provisions. A few studies have tested the effect of the positive and
nondiscrimination rights in the CEDAW, but much more work needs to be
done. As far as we know, no one has tested the effects of the CERD.
Researchers who are interested in the effect of international law on the
behavior of countries should test these treaties. Does racial discrimination
decline in countries that ratify the CERD? Does sex discrimination decline
in countries that ratify the CEDAW? We conjecture that respect for these
positive and nondiscrimination rights is rooted in historical conditions
rather than ratification patterns.
To test this conjecture, we are examining in other work how historical
attitudes toward women influence current compliance with international
obligations-most notably the CEDAW-to protect the rights of women.

C Implicationsfor the Effectiveness of Human Rights Agreements
As previously discussed, empirical studies that have examined whether
the ratification of international human rights agreements has improved
human rights practices have produced mixed results.15 8 A number of studies
have found either negative results (ratifying human rights agreements is
associated with worse human rights practice)1 59 or null results (ratifying
60
human rights agreements has no relationship to human rights practices).1
The authors who have found a positive effect have not claimed that the
ratification of human rights treaties has a consistently positive effect on
human rights practices across all countries. Instead, the positive effects that
have been found have been limited to certain sets of countries. For example,
Beth Simmons has argued that human rights agreements can improve the
human rights practices in "transitioning democracies."'61 Similarly,
Yonathan Lupu has found that the ratification of certain human rights
agreements can result in improved human rights practices when there is
157. For a list of the variables included by Fariss, see id. at 301-04.

158. See PART II.A.
159. See, e.g., Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 27.
160. See, e.g., Camp-Keith, supra note 21.
161. See SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2. Simmons argues that
transitioning democracies are countries that are neither stable democracies nor stable autocracies. To
classify which of these three categories countries fall into, Simmons relies on the Polity Database.
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either an independent judiciaryl 62 or legislative veto players to check the
executive. 163
In this paper, we do not attempt to directly test or question these
findings. Our analysis showing that current human rights practices are
strongly related to historical factors does not necessarily mean that
ratification of human rights agreements has not resulted in improved human
rights practices for some countries in some issue areas. It remains possible
that treaties have a residual effect beyond what can be explained by historical
conditions and related factors.
We do argue, however, that contemporary factors-like the ratification
of a specific treaty-are likely to have a relatively small effect on current
human rights practices compared to historical factors. For example, our
analysis would suggest that researchers interested in understanding the
current rates of torture across countries would learn more from studying
the development of high-quality institutions over time than from looking at
ratification patterns of the CAT.
III. CONCLUSION
Our results provide evidence suggesting that the variations in respect
for human rights across countries reflect, in part, conditions in those
countries (or relevant populations) in the distant past. We find evidence that
climate (latitude, mean distance to coast or river, percentage of land within
100 kilometers of coast or river), institutional transplant (settler mortality,
European share of population during colonization), and possibly
institutional lag and/or cultural transmission (years since slavery abolished,
traditional plow use, years since women's suffrage), have long-term effects
on a country's human rights performance in the theoretically correct
direction. Other variables we examined-most focused on institutional and
technological lag (legal origin, historical population density, measures of
historical state centralization, historical technology adoption, genetic
distance)-are more weakly correlated with human rights performance.
We emphasize once again that our results are only preliminary
explorations of the data, and future empirical research would be needed to
demonstrate the link between any of these historical variables and current
rights practices. If these results are validated with further statistical testing,
they will help explain why the human rights treaties have had a small impact
on countries' performance. As we have stressed, the results parallel the
findings in the development literature, which suggest that much of the
variation in economic growth across countries reflects historical and
geological factors.
162. See Lupu, Best Eidence, supranote 2.
163. See Lupu, Le-gislative Veto Players, supra note 2.
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Our results obviously do not prove that human rights treaties do not or
cannot influence human rights. The economic development literature itself
indicates that historical conditions only partly explain differences in
economic growth across countries. But our results provide evidence
suggesting that the failure by academics to find an impact for most human
rights provisions may be a consequence of the dominance of historical
factors, rather than coding problems or other methodological problems.
Our findings also indicate that existing evidence suggesting that human
rights treaties have had an impact should be revisited while considering the
influence of long run historical trends.
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APPENDIX

CorrelationsBetween Independent Vanables and Current Human Rights
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